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NOTE
Qualified Immunity Creates Nearly
Insurmountable Protection for Defendants
Against First Amendment Retaliatory Claim
Morgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2019).
Abigail Greene*

I. INTRODUCTION
There are more than 3,000 sheriffs’ departments in the United States
with varying authority based on the state and county in which they are
located.1 Their authority may be as wide reaching as a “full-service
countywide law enforcement agenc[y]” or may be as limited as having “no
law enforcement jurisdiction in county areas served by local or municipal
police departments.”2 Dissimilar to other law enforcement officials, who are
hired after an interview and application process, most sheriffs gain their
positions through partisan elections.3 Offices in forty-one states – more than
2,700 counties – conduct partisan elections for the sheriff position.4

*

B.J., University of Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2019–2020; Lead Article
Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2020-2021. I am grateful to Professor Christina Wells
for her insight, guidance, and support during the writing of this Note, as well as the
Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1. Sheriffs’
Offices,
BUREAU
OF
JUSTICE
STATISTICS,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=72 [https://perma.cc/D9QD-GSKS] (last
visited November 20, 2020).
2. Id.
3. Daniel M. Thompson, How Partisan Is Local Law Enforcement? Evidence
from Sheriff Cooperation with Immigration Authorities (Aug. 20, 2019),
http://chriswarshaw.com/lpe_conference/Thompson_Sheriffs_Immigration_Enforce
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPA4-CCLZ] (“Out of 3,142 counties or county
equivalents, 3,083 in 46 states elect a county sheriff.”).
4. Id. (“Five states, and a small number of counties outside of these states, hold
nonpartisan sheriff elections.”).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [], Art. 9

320

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

Although the length of an elected sheriff’s term varies by jurisdiction,5
incumbency gives a candidate a significant advantage in an election.6 In a
2017 study of the 200 largest jails in the United States, all but two of the
current sheriffs were incumbents.7 In the course of a contested election, nonincumbent candidates – who are employed by the sheriff as subordinate
officers – may make statements criticizing the office in some way, and
promising change for the future. With such a large number of incumbents
retaining office, however, those changes are rarely implemented, and
sometimes the losing officer is subsequently fired by the incumbent sheriff
after he or she wins the election. While it might appear the employee was
fired for speaking out during a political campaign – an area considered core
protected speech under the First Amendment – the incumbent sheriff likely
will not be liable for a First Amendment retaliation claim because he is
shielded by qualified immunity.
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that
government officials are entitled to some form of immunity – absolute or
qualified – if they meet the requirements of the defense.8 Immunity covers
suits for damages in order to “shield [officials] from undue interference with
their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”9 While some
individuals are entitled to absolute immunity, most officials, including law
enforcement officers, are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity
is a controversial and complicated doctrine that is designed to protect law
enforcement officers for actions taken in the line of duty.10 It has proved to
be difficult and complex throughout the jurisdictions based on varying
interpretations. One common theme is clear: it is nearly impossible for a
plaintiff to win against a government official because courts are so
sympathetic to a defendant’s qualified immunity arguments.

5. See Office of Sheriff State-By-State Elections Information, NATIONAL
SHERIFFS’
ASSOCIATION,
https://www.sheriffs.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/GovAffairs/State-byState%20Election%20Chart%20updated%2008.13.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLS33J2L].
6. Alex Clark, Exploring the staying power of elected sheriffs – a preliminary
analysis,
Prison
Policy
Initiative
(Aug.
24,
2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/08/24/sheriffs/
[https://perma.cc/5HX3V298].
7. Id. District of Columbia and Miami-Dade County had appointed officials to
the sheriff’s position. Id.
8. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). Absolute immunity is the
stronger form of immunity, shielding from any liability “regardless of the conduct.”
It is, however, granted to only a small group of government officials, such as judges.
Monroe Bonnheim, Immunity and Justice for All: Has the Second Circuit
Overextended the Doctrine of Absolute Immunity by Applying It to Arbitration
Witnesses?, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 217 (2009); see discussion infra notes 63–69.
9. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806.
10. Vogel Law Firm, Appeals Court Arrests Immunity Defense For LewdTalking Sheriff, 10 No. 8 N.D. Emp. L. Letter 1 (2005).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss1/9

2

Greene: Qualified Immunity Creates Nearly Insurmountable Protection for D

2021] QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FROM FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM

321

This Note examines a recent decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit finding qualified immunity applicable to a
sheriff when faced with a First Amendment retaliation suit based upon
comments made during a political campaign. Part II provides the facts and
holding of Morgan. Part III describes and analyzes the legal background of
both a First Amendment retaliation claim and the defense of qualified
immunity. Part IV states the reasoning behind the Morgan decision. Part V
examines the potential practical consequences of the qualified immunity
doctrine and the implications on plaintiffs who are seeking recourse. Finally,
Part VI summarizes the need to give less protection to incumbent sheriffs
when First Amendment retaliatory actions are taken.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2014, Donald Morgan ran against Michael Robinson – the incumbent
sheriff – in the primary election for sheriff of Washington County, Nebraska.11
Robinson had been the county’s elected sheriff since 2000.12 Morgan had
been a deputy with the sheriff’s department since 2002.13 Throughout the
campaign, Morgan made various public statements about the sheriff’s
department and his plans to improve it if he were elected.14 Robinson won
the election.15 Six days after the election, Robinson terminated Morgan’s
employment as deputy.16 Robinson claimed the reason for the termination
was that Morgan violated the sheriff’s department’s rules of conduct in
making his campaign statements.17 Specifically, the disciplinary action report
stated Morgan violated the paragraphs concerning “false statements, slander,
and honesty.”18 The statements in question were:
1. You continued to state that the communications system was not
completed after 10 years of construction although the record reflects it
was completed on time and under budget in 2006[.]
2. You stated the Fire and Rescue agencies could not communicate and
stated someone would be hurt or killed if it was not fixed although the

11. Morgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521, 522 (8th Cir. 2019).
12. Morgan v. Robinson, No. 8:14CV212, 2016 WL 10636372, at *1 (D. Neb.
Dec. 8, 2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated (Mar. 21, 2018), on reh’g en banc, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2019), and rev’d
and remanded, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2019).
13. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 522; Morgan, No. 8:14CV212, 2016 WL 10636372, at
*1.
14. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 522.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Morgan, No. 8:14CV212, 2016 WL 10636372, at *1.
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Fire Chiefs submitted a letter to the local paper saying your comments
were false.
3. You continued to tell the public that morale at the Sheriff’s Office
was bad and that “all the employees were waiting for the day after I
lost to see me walk out of the office”. [sic] You also stated several
deputies were actively looking for employment. This was proven false
when several of the Deputies were consulted and none were looking
and did not know of any deputy looking for employment and I was
overwhelmingly supported by the employees of the Sheriff’s Office.
4. You stated the K-9 had been taken from you for retribution when in
fact you demanded the K-9 be taken because it “hindered your ability
to do your job”. [sic]
5. You stated portable radio coverage was poor and continued to state
the coverage was poor even after being shown the system coverage for
portable radios was 99.2% county wide.19

Initially, Morgan brought a grievance under a labor contract in place for
his position, but the grievance was denied and that decision was upheld on
appeal.20 Next, he brought suit in the Federal District Court for the District of
Nebraska, alleging claims of “retaliation, deprivation of due process, and
breach of the labor contract.”21 The court compelled arbitration, in conformity
with the contract, and the arbitrator sustained the grievance, found in favor of
Morgan and “reinstated his employment with the sheriff’s department.”22 In
response, Robinson filed a motion to dismiss for summary judgment on the
retaliation claim in the district court.23
Upon returning to the district court, Robinson claimed he was entitled to
qualified immunity on Morgan’s First Amendment retaliation claim.24 The
district court denied that motion, finding “genuine issues of material fact
regarding the constitutionality of the termination, and whether Robinson
19. Morgan v. Robinson, 881 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated (Mar. 21, 2018), on reh’g en banc, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir.
2019). During the campaign, Morgan said:
(1) the county communications center had not been completed; (2) rural fire
departments lacked adequate radio systems; (3) the county needed more
deputies on the road; (4) the office budget did not consider the public’s needs;
(5) department morale was poor; (6) the department was not doing well; and
(7) people were leaving the office because they did not feel
respected.
Morgan, 920 F.3d at 525.
20. Morgan, No. 8:14CV212, 2016 WL 10636372, at *2.
21. Morgan, 881 F.3d at 650.
22. Id.
23. Morgan, No. 8:14CV212, 2016 WL 10636372, at *2.
24. Morgan, 881 F.3d at 650–51.
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should have reasonably known the termination was unlawful.”25 Robinson
appealed the decision, and an Eighth Circuit panel affirmed.26 Then, the
Eighth Circuit reheard the case en banc, vacated the panel decision, reversed
and remanded.27 The court held that Robinson was entitled to qualified
immunity because “the law was not sufficiently clear so that Robinson would
have known that terminating him violated his First Amendment rights.”28

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 1983 of the U.S. Code (“Section 1983”) allows an individual to
sue government officials for money damages when that official causes a
deprivation of the individual’s constitutional rights.29 Although “deceptively
simple in its construction,” Section 1983 is in reality full of complex
procedural issues.30 Section 1983 was adopted by Congress in 1871, and
provides “private remedies in the form of money damages and injunctive
relief for the infringement of constitutional rights.”31 The statute states in
relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress… 32

The Section became the “procedural keystone for the civil rights
litigation of the 1960s” and continues to be a medium that tests the “limits of
constitutional rights.”33 It provides protection only in the public sector, not
the private sector.34 Further, “the definition of person has been broadly
interpreted to include virtually any governmental entity, including cities,
counties, townships, municipal corporations, and the wide variety of local and
regional government entities.”35 Finally, Section 1983 provides a remedy of

25. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 522; Morgan, 2016 WL 10636372, at *5.
26. Morgan, 881 F.3d at 650.
27. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 523.
28. Id. at 527 (Shepherd, Kelly, and Erickson, JJ., dissenting) (citing Reichle v.
Howards, 566 U.S. 659, 664 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2018).
30. 22 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 3 (Originally published in 1993).
31. Id.
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
33. 22 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 3.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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both injunctive and monetary relief against the government entity or
individual who has violated another’s constitutional rights.36
A public sector employee may not be fired for any reason that violates
that employee’s constitutional rights because termination “as a consequence
for the making of critical comment, regardless of how motivated or directed,
violates the individual’s protected right of freedom of speech, guaranteed by
the First Amendment.”37 However, a public employee’s ability to exercise
certain First Amendment rights may be restrained, legally, when “it could lead
to inability of elected officials to get their jobs done on behalf of the public.”38
In a case of retaliatory termination, which violates an individual’s First
Amendment rights, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case and prove:
“(1) [h]is speech was protected by the First Amendment; (2) the governmental
employer discharged him from employment; and (3) the protected speech was
a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s decision to take the
adverse employment action.”39 Even if a plaintiff is able to establish a prima
facie case, however, he will not prevail if the defendant is able to establish
qualified immunity.40
Qualified – or “good faith” – immunity is an affirmative defense that
must be pleaded by a defendant official.41 The doctrine attempts to strike a
balance between “the interest in preventing, and compensating for,
constitutional violations and the interest in avoiding the overdeterrence of
independent decision making by government officials.”42 The Supreme
Court, in a handful of decisions starting in 1967, extended qualified immunity
protection to “police officers, executives, school board members, mental
hospital administrators, and prison officials.”43 “In essence, ignorance of the
law is no more a valid excuse for a government official than for the average
citizen.”44

A. Evolution of the Qualified Immunity Test
The modern test for the qualified immunity doctrine was created in
1982.45 Since then, the Supreme Court and Appellate Courts have refined and

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Gentry v Lowndes County, Miss., 337 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2003); 22 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 3.
39. 22 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 3.
40. 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE
LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 8:1 (2020).
41. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
42. NAHMOD, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. John P. Gross, Qualified Immunity and the Use of Force: Making the
Reckless into the Reasonable, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 67, 73 (2017).
45. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802.
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expanded the doctrine.46 The numerous opinions, however, require
“[o]ne…to work hard to find some doctrinal consistency or predictability in
the case law [as] the circuits are hopelessly conflicted both within and among
themselves.”47 The instability in the doctrine conveys the need of
revamping.48

1. Supreme Court
Prior to 1982, there were two components to the qualified immunity test,
an objective and subjective part.49 The Court held that “qualified immunity
would be defeated if an official knew or reasonably should have known that
the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other
injury…”50 The objective aspect “involves a presumptive knowledge of and
respect for basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.”51 The subjective aspect
“refers to permissible intentions.”52 However, the Court largely eliminated
that subjective aspect in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.53
In Harlow, petitioners Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield were
“alleged to have participated in a conspiracy to violate the constitutional and
statutory rights of … respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald.”54 Fitzgerald alleged
Harlow and Butterfield joined the conspiracy “in their capacities as senior
White House aides to former President Richard M. Nixon.”55 After Harlow
and Butterfield moved for summary judgment, the court held that they were
not entitled to absolute immunity.56 The Court discussed the two tiers of
immunity, absolute and qualified.57 Absolute immunity applies to “officials
whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete protection
from suit,” such as “the absolute immunity of legislators, in their legislative
functions … of judges, in their judicial functions … and certain officials of

46. Congressional Research Service, Policing the Police: Qualified Immunity
and
Considerations
for
Congress,
(June
25,
2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10492 [https://perma.cc/XC4Y7DT6].
47. Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the
Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 925 (2015).
48. Id.
49. NAHMOD, supra note 40.
50. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in
original).
51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 816–18.
54. Id. at 802.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 805–06.
57. Id. at 807 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the Executive Branch.”58 In contrast, executive officials in general are subject
to qualified immunity.59
These officials have “less discretionary
responsibilities” than those who require the greater protection of absolute
immunity.60 Officials that the Court has recognized qualify for this kind of
immunity include “a governor and his aides” and “high federal officials of the
Executive Branch.”61 The Court explained the acknowledgement of qualified
immunity “reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only the
importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens, … but also
the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and
the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official
authority.”62 Finally, the Court determined “the special functions of some
officials might require absolute immunity,” but “federal officials who seek
absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that
scope.”63
When examining the qualified immunity test in place at the time, the
Court noted that the subjective element of qualified immunity is incompatible
with the notion that insubstantial claims should not advance to trial because
“an official’s subjective good faith has been considered to be a question of
fact that some courts have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a
jury.”64 Inquiries into an official’s subjective good faith, says the Court, “may
entail broad-ranging discovery” and “can be peculiarly disruptive of effective
government.”65 Conversely, the objective aspect of the test can be measured
by clearly-established law and is compatible with the notion that insubstantial
claims should not advance to trial.66 The threshold immunity question,
therefore, is if the law was clearly established at the time, and “[i]f the law at
that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be
expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, not could he fairly be
said to know that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as
unlawful.”67 Conversely, “[i]f the law was clearly established, the immunity
defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official
should know the law governing his conduct.”68 Nevertheless, if the official is
able to claim extraordinary circumstances and “can prove that he neither knew
58. Id. (The covered Executive Branch officials include “prosecutors and similar
officials… executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, and the President of
the United States[.]”).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at 808 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. at 815–16.
65. Id. at 816–17.
66. Id. at 818.
67. Id. at 818 (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Id. at 818–19.
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nor should have known the relevant legal standard,” the defense of qualified
immunity can still be successful.69 Therefore, the Court held that
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”70 This test focuses on the “objective
legal reasonableness of an official’s acts.”71
The Court concluded that Harlow and Butterfield were entitled to
qualified immunity, recognizing it would be “untenable to hold absolute
immunity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordinate based in
the White House.”72 Additionally, the Court determined Harlow and
Butterfield proved entitlement to immunity based on the “special functions of
White House aides,” but only on a qualified immunity standard, as opposed
to an absolute immunity standard.73 Absolute immunity may be warranted for
some aides, specifically those “entrusted with discretionary authority in such
sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy” because it “protect[s]
the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest.”74
This exemption does not cover “all Presidential aides in the performance of
all their duties.”75 “In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a
Presidential aide first must show that the responsibilities of his office
embraced a function so sensitive as to require a total shield from liability” and
“he was discharging the protected function when performing the act for which
liability is asserted.”76 Conversely, “[t]he resolution of immunity questions
inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available
alternative.”77 The Court “relied on the assumption that this [qualified
immunity] standard would permit [i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly
terminated” when “identifying [it] as the best attainable accommodation of
competing values.”78
Therefore, the objective part of the qualified immunity test “imposes
liability only for violations of clearly settled law which a defendant, in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances, has a duty to know… [w]here there
was no clearly settled law at the time the defendant acted, the defendant
escapes § 1983 damages liability.”79

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 819.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 811–12 (internal quotations marks omitted).
Id. at 812.
Id.
Id. at 812–13.
Id. at 813.
Id. at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted).
NAHMOD, supra note 40.
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Since the Harlow decision in 1982, the Supreme Court has only applied
the Harlow standard in twenty-seven qualified immunity cases.80 Of those
twenty-seven cases, the official prevailed in all but three.81 Groh v. Ramirez,
decided in 2004, involved a “glaring mistake in a search warrant,”82 and Hope
v. Pelzer, decided in 2002, involved “the use of a hitching post for prison
discipline, in apparent violation of longstanding circuit precedent.”83 Finally,
Malley v. Briggs, decided in 1986, “ordered a remand after rejecting (inter
alia) an officer’s argument that so long as he does not lie, ‘the act of applying
for a warrant is per se objectively reasonable.’”84 The Court’s precedent has
not merely maintained the doctrine of qualified immunity, but has “doubl[ed]
down on it, enforcing it aggressively against lower courts,” which ultimately
sends a message to lower courts to “think twice before allowing a
governmental official to be sued for unconstitutional conduct.”85
Consequently, lower courts are left to translate the Court’s message as
they hear thousands of cases involving qualified immunity. Specifically,
lower courts hear a multitude of First Amendment retaliation claims where
qualified immunity is raised as a defense. Appellate court decisions regarding
First Amendment retaliation claims and Section 1983 are not uncommon,
especially within the specific context of a sheriff’s department, but the results
of such cases are complicated, especially when compared against other
circuits. While it is well settled law “that a state or local government cannot
condition public employment on a basis that infringes upon a public
employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression, …
the way that federal and state courts have applied the legal standards … has
made it very difficult to predict the outcome in many free speech cases.”86
Aspects like “the background and composition of a particular circuit or
appellate panel may affect the way the balancing test is applied.”87 It is clear
that “the doctrine of qualified immunity creates a fog of uncertainty
surrounding constitutional rights.”88

80. William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? 39 (Univ. of Chi. L. Sch.,
Working
Paper
No.
610,
2017),
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2070&context=pu
blic_law_and_legal_theory [https://perma.cc/2P57-3F8N].
81. Id.
82. 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004)
83. 536 U.S. 730, 741-46 (2002)
84. 475 U.S. 355, 345 (1986)
85. Baude, supra note 80, at 41.
86. William Herbert, Balancing Test and Other Factors Assess Ability of Public
Employees to Exercise Free Speech Rights, N.Y. ST. B.J. 24 (2002).
87. Id. (“One circuit’s application of the balancing test may have little or no
persuasive value in another circuit considering a case with similar facts.”).
88. Gross, supra note 45, at 82.
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2. Appellate Court Cases Involving General Critical Speech
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided
a case involving a First Amendment retaliation claim advanced by two
officers against the chief of a police department, based on comments made to
each of them and other officers about police department matters.89 The police
chief claimed qualified immunity and filed a motion for judgment on the
pleading, seeking to dismiss the individual claims.90 The officers were
suspended after the chief allegedly “illegally search[ed] and analyz[ed]
recorded telephone conversations between other officers and superiors.”91
The conversations concerned four matters: “(1) requesting criminal offender
record information … about several individuals; (2) criticizing the deputy
chief and other department management; (3) discussing the chief’s
absenteeism and referring to him as ‘No Show Joe’; (4) discussing safety
issues concerning the Dudley Station of the [police department].”92 Plaintiffs
alleged that the personal discipline resulting from these matters caused
damages due to their criticism of both “his job performance and the job
performance of his deputies” and therefore was a violation of their free speech
rights under the First Amendment.93 The district court rejected the chief’s
claim of qualified immunity, and the First Circuit affirmed.94 The court
recognized, however, that the relevant qualified immunity case law was
generally in the chief’s favor, but because all inferences are drawn in favor of
the plaintiff, the chief does not succeed.95 First, the court found that the
speech could fall within an area of public concern, as the alleged complaints
about the department could be relevant to conditions for the general public.96
Second, the court found the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a constitutional
violation.97 Third, the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity based on
an argument that the law was unsettled at the time of the conduct:
If plaintiffs’ criticism consisted of serious expression of concern,
voiced in an appropriate manner, about the effect of their supervisors’
poor performance on public safety or other public matters, and
appellant’s retaliation was primarily aimed at silencing their criticism
for his own advantage, precedent would have clearly established that
the balance of interests tipped decisively in plaintiff’s favor.98

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Jordan v. Carter, 428 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 70–71.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.
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Finally, the court determined that it could not award immunity to the
sheriff because it rejected the sheriff’s argument that “a reasonable officer
would not have realized the impropriety of his conduct.”99 Overall, the court
cited the insufficient record as the basis for most of its conclusions.100
In 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard
a case brought by Patrick Cromer, a former employee of the sheriff’s
department of Greenville County, South Carolina.101 Cromer alleged he was
fired from the department as a result of his speech, after he joined a black
officers association and made comments about “perceived racial
discrimination in the sheriff’s office.”102 The association submitted a letter to
the sheriff that discussed how the unwritten policies of the department had
inhibited “the advancement of Black officers,” how black officers were
receiving unequal treatment in several areas within the department, and
alleged biases against black officers on the promotional boards.103 The sheriff
blamed Cromer and denied each of the charges, in a response letter to the
association.104 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
sheriff in his individual capacity,105 holding he was entitled to qualified
immunity.106 The Fourth Circuit reversed on this point.107 Conversely, it
affirmed on the district court’s holding that the sheriff, in his official capacity
as a state official, was “immune from suit for money damages.”108 The court
found that at the time of Cromer’s termination, “existing decisions in our sister
circuits had given First Amendment protection to speech like Cromer’s, that
is, a police officer’s expressions of concern about racial discrimination and
animus in his agency.”109 Specifically, “the First Amendment does not allow
state officials to take adverse employment action against an employee who
speaks out about the practice of racial discrimination in a law enforcement

99. Id. at 76.
100. Id.
101. Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1318 (4th Cir. 1996).
102. Id. Cromer held the position of captain, was demoted to lieutenant, and then
was fired. Id. Cromer also alleged that his termination was due to racial discrimination,
but that will not be discussed in this note, as it is outside of the scope. Id.
103. Id. at 1320.
104. Id. at 1321.
105. There is a distinction for purposes of damages between liability in one’s
individual or official capacity. Pursuing action against the sheriff in his individual
capacity seeks to impose personal liability, while pursuing action against the sheriff
in his official capacity as a state official seeks to recover from the state treasury of
which the officer is an agent. Bench Book – 5.3.1.1 Official Capacity versus Individual
Capacity, INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR ADULT OFFENDER SUPERVISION (2020),
https://www.interstatecompact.org/bench-book/ch5/5-3-1-1-official-capacity-versusindividual-capacity [https://perma.cc/F44L-T2NJ] (last visited March 16, 2021).
106. Cromer, 88 F.3d at 1318.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1329.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss1/9

12

Greene: Qualified Immunity Creates Nearly Insurmountable Protection for D

2021] QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FROM FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM

331

agency.”110 Finally, under Harlow, the court held “any reasonable official in
[the sheriff’s] shoes would have realized he would violate the Constitution if
he fired Cromer for speaking of widely held concerns about racial
discrimination in the sheriff’s office.”111
In 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
heard a wrongful termination in violation of the First Amendment suit brought
by a police officer against the department’s chief of police.112 The officer had
voiced concerns that the chief had stolen money from the evidence room,
which were based mainly on the chief being manager over the evidence
room.113 The district court denied the chief’s motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed.114 The court
found the statements addressed public concern, there was no evidence of
disruption of the office operations, there was a jury question on the element
of causation, and the evidence was not strong enough for judgment on a matter
of law.115 Additionally, “a reasonable police chief could have lawfully
terminated [the officer] for his misconduct and could have considered [the]
termination proper, even if motivated in substantial part by an unlawful
motive [the] termination … was objectively reasonable for purposes of
qualified immunity.”116

3. Appellate Court Cases Involving Campaign-Related Speech
In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard a
First Amendment retaliation case where deputies were transferred to lessdesirable positions after announcing they were running for the sheriff’s
position.117 These transfers were for an indefinite time, and “[a]lthough the
transfers did not result in a decrease in pay, each man considered his transfer
a demotion.”118 The district court found in favor of the sheriff, finding
qualified immunity provided protection.119 First, the court found that a
transfer alone was enough to deprive the plaintiff employees of their rights.120
These positions were “not as interesting or prestigious” as their previous jobs,
even if there was no reduction in salary.121 Appellate level precedent had
established that “the law was established clearly enough in this circuit in
January 1988 that a reasonable officer should have known that if he retaliated
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1331.
Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1282 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1288–94.
Id. at 1297–98.
Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1992).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 110.
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against an employee for exercising his First Amendment rights, he could not
escape liability by demoting and transferring the employee rather than
discharging him.”122 Therefore, the court concluded the district court erred in
finding the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity.123
In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard
a case involving a sheriff allegedly refusing to reappoint deputy sheriffs in
retaliation of their support for his political opponent in the election for
sheriff.124 This support took the form of speaking with others in their
respective neighborhoods about the opposing candidate and encouraging yard
signs in their yards, car bumper stickers on their own cars and yard signs, and
attending a political dinner while sitting at the opposing party’s table.125 After
he took office, the sheriff did not rehire the deputies, citing reasons of
frequenting “an adult entertainment club” and receiving complaints about the
handling of several rape cases.126 The district court denied the sheriff’s
motion for summary judgment based on his qualified immunity claim.127 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the sheriff was not
protected by qualified immunity.128 First, the court found that the sheriff had
not demonstrated that the deputy sheriffs may be dismissed due to their
political affiliation.129 Next, the court determined the law was sufficiently
clear that “a reasonable official would have understood that taking such an
action against them for political reasons was unconstitutional.”130
In 2014, the Eighth Circuit heard a case brought by a deputy sheriff
alleging First Amendment retaliation after the deputy ran against the current
sheriff.131 The sheriff did not claim the campaign was interfered with in any
way, and ultimately, the sheriff won the election.132 The day after the election,
the sheriff fired the deputy sheriff, after being told by the human resources
consultant and attorney that the sheriff was within his authority to terminate
the deputy.133 This termination caused “some unrest in the County and
resulted in a recall election,” which the sheriff also won.134 During the recall
campaign, the sheriff “made statements that [the deputy] was fired in
accordance with an unwritten rule that deputy sheriffs who run against the
sheriff will be fired and for certain statements [the deputy] made during the

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 111.
Id. at 113.
Heggen v. Lee, 284 F.3d 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 679.
Id.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 686.
Id.
Nord v. Walsh Cty., 757 F.3d 734, 737–38 (8th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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campaign.”135 The deputy’s speech included that the sherrif “should not be
running for office because his health was so bad,” that his wife did not want
him to run for sheriff, and that the sheriff was going to resign in two years and
run for state senate.136 The district court denied the sheriff’s summary
judgment motion that asserted a qualified immunity defense.137 The Eighth
Circuit reversed.138 The court found that “based upon … precedent and a fair
reading of North Dakota Attorney General opinions on the subject, a North
Dakota sheriff, in light of pre-existing law, could, and perhaps should, believe
that his deputies are at will employees.”139 The court recognized that “the
latitude the courts accord a managing law enforcement officer in executing
his official duties, including the hiring and firing of employees-especially
subordinate officers.”140 The court acknowledged that “Supreme Court
precedent strongly implies that some speech may be protected and some may
not,” but that political speech deserves First Amendment protection, while
false factual statements have diminished value.141 Therefore, the court held
(1) that at least some of [the deputy’s] campaign speech does not merit
First Amendment protection…; (2) that even if [the deputy’s] speech
was fully protected by the Constitution, [the sheriff] could have
reasonably believed that the speech would be at least potentially
damaging to and disruptive of the discipline and harmony of and
among co-workers in the sheriff’s office and detrimental to the close
working relationships and personal loyalties necessary for an effective
and trusted local policing operation … and the above-mentioned
adverse employer-employee circumstance did not need to become
manifest in order to be acted upon promptly …; (3) that … [the sheriff]
could have logically and rationally believed that his decision to
terminate [the deputy] was well within the breathing room accorded
him as a public official in making a reasonable, even if mistaken,
judgment under the circumstances…; and thus (4) [the sheriff] is
entitled to qualified immunity to shield him from liability claimed to
have arise through violation of the First Amendment as asserted.142

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Morgan, the Eighth Circuit first discussed that “an immediate appeal
is appropriate…if the moving party claims qualified immunity…because

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. at 742 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 738.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 741 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 742–43.
Id. at 743 (internal citations omitted).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [], Art. 9

334

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

immunity is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”143
The court established the standard of review for a denial “of summary
judgment based on qualified immunity” is de novo.144
Next, the court gave background on the doctrine of qualified immunity,
which “shields officials from civil liability in [Section] 1983 actions when
their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”145 The court cited
the two-step qualified immunity analysis used in Eighth Circuit precedent:
“Qualified immunity analysis requires a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the
facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or
statutory right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time
of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.”146 Unless both of those inquiries are
answered affirmatively, the “appellate is entitled to qualified immunity.”147
Finally, courts are allowed to use their “sound discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs … should be addressed first.”148
The court began its analysis by stating it was unnecessary to consider the
issue of whether there was “genuine issue of material factors” surrounding
Morgan’s termination, which would go to the first prong analysis, because the
second prong was not satisfied.149 In other words, “Robinson did not violate
a clearly established statutory or constitutional right[] of which a reasonable
person would have known.”150
A clearly-established statutory or constitutional right is a right that is
“sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that
what he is doing violates that right.”151 Further, a clearly-established right
should be “particularized to the facts of the case”152 rather than “defined at a
high level of generality.”153 Precedent must exist that makes the right question
143. Morgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Division of
Emp’t Sec. v. Board of Police Comm’rs, 864 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 2017)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
146. Id. (citing Nord v. Walsh Cty., 757 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2014)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
147. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
149. Id. (citing Morgan v. Robinson, No. 8:14CV212, 2016 WL 10636372, at *5
(D. Neb. Dec. 8, 2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated (Mar. 21, 2018), on reh’g en banc, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2019),
and rev’d and remanded, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2019)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
150. Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231).
151. Id. (citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)).
152. Id. at 524 (citing White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
153. Id. at 523 (same) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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“beyond debate.”154 The policy behind qualified immunity is that it “gives
government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken
judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.”155
The court determined there was a clearly established right when Morgan
was terminated by analogizing to Nord v. Walsh.156 This Eighth Circuit case
determined the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity due to established
state and federal law, and advice the sheriff received from the county attorney
and the human resources consultant.157 Further, the sheriff’s department
“enforces the police powers in the county” with a small department, and the
sheriff “has the power to appoint and terminate deputies.”158 Finally, the
sheriff “has an interest in maintaining the efficient operation of the office.”159
The court found two distinctions with Nord but determined neither
demanded a different outcome.160 First, the speech in this case concerned
“matters of public concern,” while in Nord the speech concerned personal
attacks at the sheriff.161 Second, there was no disruption in Nord, and here,
“Robinson testified he believed Morgan’s statements were detrimental to the
office, harmful to morale, and adversely impacted the public’s trust of the
office” and deputies held the same beliefs.162 In fact, the “entire command
staff,” which consisted of five deputies, recommended Morgan be
terminated.163
The court acknowledged that Nord was decided one month after Morgan
was fired.164 However, the court maintained that Nord supports Robinson,
because the facts are similar, the “decision held the law was not clearly
established in November 2010,” and “[n]either Morgan nor this court finds
any intervening law that clearly established the law before his termination.”165
Therefore, it follows that “the constitutional question was not beyond debate
in May 2014.”166
Even if Robinson could not advance evidence of this disruption,
Robinson could still claim qualified immunity because “there is no necessity

154. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
155. Id. at 524 (citing Stanton v. Wims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
156. Id.; Nord v. Walsh Cty., 757 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2014); see supra section
III.A.2.
157. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 524; Nord, 757 F.3d at 743–45.
158. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 524; see NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1704.01.
159. Id. at 525.; Morgan v. Robinson, 881 F.3d 646, 653–54 (8th Cir. 2018).
160. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 525.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 526.
165. Id. at 526–27.
166. Id. at 527 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of
the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before
taking action.”167 This concern is even more apparent with the sheriff’s job
because of his duty to manage, hire, and fire subordinate officers.168 The facts
here, specifically “[t]he termination letter, Robinson’s testimony, and the
testimony of five other deputies,” demonstrate that Robinson “could have
reasonably believed that Morgan’s speech was at least potentially damaging
to and disruptive of the discipline and harmony of and among co-workers in
the sheriff’s office and detrimental to the close working relationships and
personal loyalties necessary for an effective and trusted local policing
operation.”169 Therefore, “[a]t the time of Morgan’s termination, the law was
not sufficiently clear so that Robinson would have known that terminating
him violated his First Amendment rights”170 and Robinson is shielded by
qualified immunity.171
The dissent, authored by Judge Shepherd, argues it was proper to affirm
the district court’s denial of Robinson’s qualified immunity and focused on
the majority’s alleged error in “rest[ing] on the impermissible factual finding”
that Robinson terminated Morgan because of the “potentially damaging and
disruptive consequences” of the campaign speech.172 Conversely, the dissent
argues that when viewing the record in favor of Morgan, which is “the proper
lens of a summary judgment appeal,” Robinson had instead terminated
Morgan solely because of the campaign speech.173 The dissent rests on the
contention that the majority failed to adhere to precedent regarding the proper
standard of review.174
Under the proper standard, the dissent first found that Morgan’s
campaign statements were made as a citizen and addressed matters of public
concern, which “lies at the heart of the First Amendment” and can trigger a
First Amendment claim.175 Next, the dissent stated it was unreasonable for
Robinson to use the potentially damaging and disruptive rationale176 for
Morgan’s termination because of the “significant evidence” of the termination
being based on the campaign speech that “challeng[ed] Robinson’s record and
call[ed] attention to his view of the status of Sheriff Department

167. Id. at 525 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152, 154 (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Id. at 526; Nord v. Walsh Cty., 757 F.3d 734, 741 (8th Cir. 2014).
169. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 526; Nord, 757 F.3d at 743.
170. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 527 (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664
(2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. Id. at 527.
172. Id. (Shepherd, Kelly, and Erickson, JJ., dissenting).
173. Id. at 527–28.
174. Id. at 528.
175. Id. at 530–31.
176. Id. at 525–26 (majority opinion); Nord v. Walsh Cty., 757 F.3d 734, 743 (8th
Cir. 2014).
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operations.”177 Finally, the dissent would find it is clearly established that
Robinson could not terminate Morgan for the campaign speech because
Robinson could not have reasonably believed at the time of termination that
“a government employer could fire an employee on account of the employee
exercising his First Amendment right to free speech during a run for political
office where that speech had no disruptive impact on office functioning.”178
The dissent also criticizes the majority’s reliance on Nord v. Walsh, stating
“the majority diminishes critical distinctions in Nord,” specifically that Nord
spoke out about “the sheriff’s personal attributes and fitness for office” and
Morgan, conversely, addressed department-wide operation issues.179

V. COMMENT
Although the procedural pitfalls of a First Amendment retaliation claim
involving a qualified immunity defense can make comparing cases and
jurisdictional trends difficult, other aspects of this particular claim add to the
confusion. Differences between circuits create confusing standards for
plaintiffs and subordinates to follow and base their claims on. It is worth
noting, however, that some of these differences may be inevitable, as the
analysis is fact specific, and the law is consistently changing. If at the time of
the decision the law is established, it may change before the court hears
another case on the same qualified immunity issue. For example, the Sixth
Circuit, seventeen years before Morgan, found no qualified immunity in a
case involving termination based on political opponent support in an election
for sheriff.180 Contrarily, the Eleventh Circuit, nineteen years before Morgan,
held that qualified immunity applied where a police officer was fired allegedly
in retaliation for accusing the police chief of theft.181 Even in the Eighth
Circuit, within a matter of one year, the law changed so that qualified
immunity applied to Robinson. Another difference in the two Morgan
decisions out of the Eighth Circuit is that the first was heard by a panel of
three judges,182 while the second was heard en banc. The preceding reasons
are just a handful of existing factors that make these types of cases extremely
unpredictable.
Cases involving a qualified immunity defense make success unlikely,
as “suits against governmental officials almost never succeed.”183 It is notable

177. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 532 (Shepherd, Kelly, and Erickson, JJ., dissenting).
178. Id. at 533.
179. Id. at 535.
180. Heggen v. Lee, 284 F.3d 675, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2002).
181. Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000).
182. The three-judge panel was Judges Benton, Shepherd, and Kelly. Morgan, 881
F.3d at 649.
183. George Leef, Qualified Immunity – A Rootless Doctrine The Court Should
Jettison,
FORBES
(March
21,
2018,
9:53
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2018/03/21/qualified-immunity-a-rootless-
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that sheriffs generally have “absolute control over the selection and retention
of deputy sheriffs.”184 Further, the sheriff is “generally given broad authority
in the selection and dismissal of deputies, both because the sheriff is
responsible for the neglects and defaults of a deputy and so that law
enforcement can be centralized in the county.”185 This creates a pretty high
bar for sheriffs to be found to not have acted in an objectively reasonable
manner. This thought is stated well in the dissent of Morgan: “Sheriff
Robinson terminated Morgan’s employment solely because of his personal
objections to the content of Morgan’s campaign speech without the reasonable
belief that the statements would have a disruptive effect on the operation of
the Sheriff’s department.”186
The doctrine of qualified immunity is designed to shield government
officials, but it has resulted in excusing egregious government action in many
cases. Courts across the United States each year “grant government officials
qualified immunity in decisions that describe tragic facts and outrageous
behavior.”187 For example, “defendants who have searched homes without
probable cause, stolen property in police custody, fabricated evidence, and
used excessive force are shielded from liability.”188
The need for and justifications of protecting officials when exercising
their decisions in regard to their official authority is apparent; however,
because Harlow largely removed the subjective element of the qualified
immunity defense, it is likely that a sheriff with personal vendettas against a
subordinate could articulate an objectively reasonable basis for the
termination, even if there was subjective intent behind it. Further, actual
disruption is not a prerequisite to advance a qualified immunity defense and
punishment is permitted for speech on issues of public concern. Harlow
increases the risk that subordinates could suffer wrongful termination based
on personal issues because it gives wide protection and discretion to sheriffs
and other officers, leaving those individuals no option for recourse.
Specific to the First Amendment, Harlow might invite corruption into
the system and discourage improvement. By protecting government actors,
such as sheriffs, through qualified immunity, it could provoke a fear to speak
out about current problems in a system. If an individual knows they may lose
their job if they attempt to speak out and implement change, they may decide
that is not worth it. Additionally, in order to pre-determine if a government
doctrine-the-court-should-jettison/?sh=3cddb5031c71
[https://perma.cc/CFZ29DEY].
184. Romualdo P. Eclavea and Alan J. Jacobs, Appointment or election – Of
deputy sheriffs, in 70 Am. Jur. 2d Sheriffs, Police, and Constables § 14 (November
2020 Update).
185. Id.
186. Morgan, 920 F.3d at 527–28 (Shepherd, Kelly and Erickson, JJ., dissenting).
187. Joanna Schwartz, Imagining a World Without Qualified Immunity, Part I,
REASON
(Sept.
16,
2019,
8:03
AM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2019/09/16/imagining-a-world-without-qualifiedimmunity-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/VLG9-Y6JC].
188. Id.
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actor will be shielded from liability, it would require actively keeping up with
appellate specific decisions, drastically inhibiting one’s freedom to speak
when and how they would like.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has advanced three justifications for qualified
immunity: (1) “it derives from a common law ‘good faith’ defense”; (2) “it
compensates for an earlier putative mistake in broadening the statute”; and (3)
“it provides ‘fair warning’ to government officials, akin to the rule of
lenity.”189 By examining the modern state of the qualified immunity defense,
however, it is clear the articulated justifications of the defense do not stand up
to the negatives it produces today. The doctrine has been interpreted in
various ways by lower courts, causing a world of uncertainty and unfairness
when a victim of egregious government action seeks a monetary remedy.
Government officials are shielded from anything that is clearly established at
the time of the action, which results in that official escaping liability in a
majority of the cases. While this deters meritless lawsuits, it also deters valid
suits that will not be pursued given the uncertainty and hurdles that plaintiff
faces.
Specific to the First Amendment, shielding government actors who take
retaliatory action creates an environment of fear, where improvements will be
hard to advocate for and implement, and corruption is not uncommon. Given
the wide latitude a sheriff is granted when managing his department, he should
be protected by the same level of employee protection as a regular,
nongovernmental citizen when it comes to retaliatory actions against an
opposing party in an election.

189. William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 46
(2018).
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